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An Initial Assessment  of
Land Reform in South Africa
Abstract: We use evidence from a survey of about 1,200 South African land reform beneficiaries to assess
performance of  the initial phase  of South Africa's  land reform program.  We  find  that  even though the
program  has not  lived up to  the quantitative  goals set, it  was targeted to the  poor  and has led  to the
establishment to a significant number of projects that generate sustainable revenues. The lessons from these
projects is that greater beneficiary participation and involvement of NGOs and the private sector are likely to
be key to establishing a program that can make a substantive contribution to solving the problems confronting
rural South Africa.
1  Introduction
Whether redistribution and the associated focus on distributional equity may be consistent with, or even
conducive to, a growth-oriented strategy has been one of the key concerns of development economics.
Traditionally,  there  was  broad  consensus  that  growth  would  be  helped  by  and/or  associated with
increasing inequality; a notion often associated with the famous hypothesis by Kuznets (1955). This was
contested by  scholars emphasizing the importance of "growth with equity" and redistribution as a basis
for subsequent growth (Adelman  1995). More recently, theoretical arguments that link aggregate growth
to inequality have led to renewed interest in this debate, generally supporting the notion of a systematic
link between inequality in the distribution of assets and economic growth. There is now broad stream of
literature now suggests that redistributive efforts by government could, through increased investment by
the poor, actually lead to higher growth (Aghion et al. 1999, Bardhan et al. 1999 and references cited
therein),  contrary to  some earlier  models  which  maintained that  redistribution  would  reduce  growth
(Persson and Tabellini 1994).
Empirical support for these hypotheses, in the form of demonstrating the importance of initial conditions
on subsequent economic performance, is available both at the household and the cross-country level. For
individuals, it has been shown that initial wealth and associated borrowing constraints affect households'
ability to make productive investments, acquire human capital, and start up enterprises (Blanchflower and
Oswald  1998), resulting in possibly different trajectories of development  (Piketty  1999), and affecting
2broader  socio-economic  phenomena  such as  social  cohesion and  crime  (Fajnzylber  et  al.  1998). In
developing  countries,  credit  constraints  may  prevent  poor  households  from  making  profitable  but
indivisible  investments - such as sending talented children  to school. This may  give  rise to  "poverty
traps",  i.e. situations where poverty is perpetuated only because households lack the endowments needed
to  overcome  market  imperfections  that  would  allow them  to  make  otherwise  profitable  investments
(Fafchamps and  Pender  1997; Jalan and Ravallion  1999). At the cross-country  level, even though the
relationship  between  income  inequality  and  growth  is  ambiguous  (Banerjee  and  Duflo  1999), the
distribution of assets seems to be strongly associated with subsequent growth performance (Birdsall and
Londono 1998; Deininger and Squire 1998; Deininger and Olinto, 2000).
In this  paper, we  examine  actual  implementation  of a program  of redistributive  reform  using  as an
example the case  of land reform  in South Africa. This is of interest for a number of reasons. First,  in
South Africa,  post apartheid  governments have moved  with determination to implement  redistributive
programs to overcome the legacy of discriminatory policies and practices they inherited. Land reform is
one out  of three  major  redistributive  policies that  are backed by  a broad  consensus on  the  need  for
redistributive programs to redress inequities in access to resources and economic opportunities.  Second,
ever since its conception, the South African land reform program has been accompanied  by a debate on
whether the goal of poverty reduction can be combined with a focus on  improving productive efficiency
(e.g. van Zyl et al. 1996; Levin and Weiner 1997; Lipton, Ellis, and Lipton 1996). This discussion  is far
from over (see Cousins, 2000) but thus far, most of the evidence on the extent to which land reform has
accomplished its goal remains anecdotal. Finally, South Africa chose to follow a decentralized model of
"negotiated"  land reform  whereby poor people receive  a grant to  enable them  to acquire land. As this
model  is  currently  being  debated  or  implemented  in  a  number  of  other  countries  including  Brazil,
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe, evidence on emerging experience is of
broader interest. 2
We  use data from  a recent  survey of  land reform  beneficiaries to  examine to  what extent  the  South
African  land  reform  program has been  successful  in combining equity and  efficiency.  To  do  so, we
examine evidence on the targeting and productive impact of the land reform program, the degree to which
the program lived up to  expectations, and the scope to improve performance through modifications  in
program design. Section two presents a general description of rural poverty and the agricultural structure
2  For  Brazil  see  Buainain  et  al.  1999,  Navarro  1998  and  the  documents  at  http://www.dataterra.org.br  and
http://www.nead.gov.br;  for Colombia  Machado  and  Suarez  1999, for  Guatemala  see  the Peace  Accords  (Government  of
Guatemala 1996), for Honduras see Korczowski,  1999; for the Philippines see Hayami et al. 1990 and Deininger et al. 1999, for
Zimbabwe see Moyo  1998 and Government of Zimbabwe 1998. The underlying concept of providing a grant for poor people to
acquire land has also been applied in India (Agarwal, 1998).
3in South Africa.  Section three  discusses the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) and key
decisions  regarding  its design.  Section  four examines the degree to  which  land reform  was targeted
towards the poor, whether there is a conflict between the goals of equity and economic viability, and the
characteristics  of  economically  successful  projects.  Section  five  concludes  by  drawing  out  main
implications.
2  Background
Based on a history of dispossession of its black population, South Africa's rural sector is characterized by
a highly bi-modal  distribution  of livelihood  opportunities and a  dependence of the rural  economy on
migrant  remittances  and  government  handouts. Development  of the  productive  potential  of the  rural
sector appears to be a critical pre-condition for sustainable poverty reduction. To create the environment
for such a revival and restructuring of rural areas, the new government implemented, from  1994, a far-
reaching program of agricultural liberalization. As a result of this program, barriers to market entry (both
domestically as well as for export) were removed and price incentives shifted towards high-value  labor
intensive crops. At the  same time, land prices declined dramatically and there has been a considerable
increase in the supply of land  on the market. This created favorable conditions for  a program of land
reform  utilizing  market  transactions  together  with  a  government  grant,  rather  than  expropriation,  to
transfer assets to the poor.
2.1  South Africa's rural sector
It is impossible to appreciate the nature of rural poverty and the challenges facing land reform  in South
Africa without an understanding of the profound nature of discrimination that resulted from the policy of
apartheid.  In contrast to most other countries that are characterized by unequal distribution of agricultural
land, the specific development path followed in South Africa's  rural areas virtually eliminated the small
farming  sector.  Instead it  established  a dualistic structure of highly mechanized  white large  farms  as
compared to overcrowded black homelands and dormitory towns (Mbeki, 1984; Morris, 1976).
Following  a  number  of earlier  legal interventions with  similar  goals,  the Native  Lands  Act  of  1912
prohibited the establishment of new farming operations, sharecropping, or cash rentals by blacks outside
of the reserves, which made up only 7.7% of the country's  area. Inside the reserves, an artificial form of
"traditional"  tenure  with  maximum  holding  sizes  and  restrictions  on  land  transactions  was imposed,
giving considerable  power to collaborative  local  chiefs.  Subsequent policies of "black  spot removal"
transferred  the majority  of black  farmers who  had  legitimately  owned land  outside  the  reserves  into
homelands  or bantustans  where tenure  restrictions,  high  population density,  and  lack  of capital  and
market  access made  commercial  agriculture  virtually  impossible. An  estimated  475,000  people were
4relolacted in this  manner from "Black Spots" between 1960 and  19833.  Labor laws that discriminated
against blacks in favor of white workers and generous capital subsidies to white farmers contributed to
successive evictions  of  large parts  of the  black  population from  white farms,  where  they  had  been
employed as labor tenants and farm workers (Binswanger and Deininger, 1993).
While the Native Lands Act was repealed in 1993, the momentous task of a comprehensive reversal of the
other policies and their consequences was left to the government that entered power following the  1994
elections. In attempting to do so, this  government had to contend not only with the extremely  unequal
land distribution (the average amount held per  person was 1.3 hectares  by blacks compared to  1,570
hectares by  whites). 4 This was exacerbated by the lack of any local government structure, widespread
absence of administrative capacity, and the legacy of mis-directed  agricultural policies which  included
subsidies to capital and fertilizer, public sector marketing monopolies, and a legislative environment that
undermined the operation of factor markets.
The impact of policy distortions in the agricultural sector can be appreciated from the fact that, instead of
the specialization in labor-intensive production of high value crops and agro-exportables that one would
expect given the country's  natural endowment, South Africa's  agricultural sector focused on crops (e.g.
wheat) not in line with its comparative advantage and with very low potential for employment generation.
In the relatively small homeland areas, millions of poor relied on scarce natural resources to complement
remittances and pensions from 'outside' as part of a survival strategy. On white commercial  farms, by
contrast, abundant natural resources were used by a small number of the 'privileged' to produce increasing
surpluses.  There  is agreement  that, even  though  these policies  allowed  the country  to  achieve  self-
sufficiency in food and create a  highly technified agricultural  sector, the costs - in social  as well  as
economic terms- of doing so have been very high (Wilson and Ramphele 1989).
To reverse this trend and establish a more diverse rural structure, a liberalization program was initiated
(Kirsten et al. 1998) to (i) further reform the input and output marketing system; (ii) reduce concentration
in the agro-processing sector; (iii) restructure the system of rural financialintermediation; (iv) revise land
sub-division  legislation  and  other  legal  acts  that  had  been  established  with  the  express  goal  of
discriminating against the black population; and to (v) upgrade of agricultural support services and invest
in an improved physical and social infrastructure in the former homelands. These measures set in motion
a serious decline in the profitability of  'traditional'  crops, an increase in productivity due to a shift to
higher value production, and a dramatic  increase in the number of indebted farms  (van Rooyen et al.
3The  comprehensive reports produced by the Surplus People's Project have documented this history, see SPP 1983.
4The  white-owned, large-scale farm sector accounted for 90 per cent of the value added and owns 86 per cent of the agricultural
land.
51998). This  created the  environment in which  a  demand-driven approach to  land  reform  would be
feasible.
Indeed, there was a significant increase in the number of land sales transactions - more than 6% of all
agricultural land changed hands in both 1997 and 1998. Land prices declined by more than 15% between
1994 and 1999 in real terms, and more than 10%  of all agricultural land in the commercial farming areas
are currently up for sale. Due to increased supply, market values of agricultural land are close to, and in
some cases below, the net present value of agricultural profits. Skilled entrepreneurs are able to buy land
on  the market, financing the purchase price  from the proceeds from farming  it. Land rental  markets,
which were small prior to  1994 mushroomed as well; nearly 10% of the total land area were, in 1998,
farmed under rental arrangements. Before assessing how this has affected the opportunities for productive
development by South Africa's  most disadvantaged, we briefly describe general characteristics of rural
poverty in the country.
2.2  Rural poverty and livelihoods in South Africa
The apartheid system relied on the existence of a rural population in traditional bantustans unable to be
self-sufficient and therefore bound to a migrant labor system, but still tied to the land. In this way, rural
areas provided residence, services and some income for urban and mine workers' families, to supplement
the  low  wages paid  to  them.  Similarly, outside  the  bantustans, rural  areas are  characterized by  the
existence  of  an  over-capitalized,  over-mechanized, job-shedding  commercial  agriculture  sector,  a
vulnerable farm worker population, and rural dormitory towns that offer few economic opportunities. For
bantustans bordering  commercial  farming  areas, large numbers  of farm workers  are threatened  with
losing both job and housing. Thus, inside and outside the  bantustans, rural areas entered South Africa's
transition with a legacy of squandered assets and inappropriate production and investment strategies. The
contraction of the economy and the erosion of the rural economic base through population growth in the
absence of productive  infrastructure implied that households previously dependent upon a cash income
were left with neither the income nor the assets from which they could generate an adequate income. The
resulting combination of lack of assets, absence of economic opportunities, and high levels of poverty
threatens to persist long after South Africa's political transition.
The extent of rural poverty is confirmed by data from the 1993 SALDRU survey. As Table  I illustrates,
approximately half of South Africa's total population are poor but the poverty headcount in rural areas is
71%, compared to 29% in urban areas (SALDRU 1994). Thus, most of South Africa's poor, about 13.7
million people, live in rural areas. More than three quarters (76%) of the total poverty gap is accounted
for by  rural households, although they make  up only half of the total  population. Table 2  shows the
poverty gap and the percentage of the population categorized as non-urban by the 1996 census for each
6province, illustrating that the spatial  distribution of poverty differs across markedly across provinces.
Poverty rates are highest in the Northern Province and Free State, although the depth of poverty is highest
in the Free State and Eastern Cape  5 The poverty gap (i.e. the amount that is needed annually to wipe out
poverty through a perfectly targeted transfer to the poor) in 1995 was about R15 billion, or about 4% of
GDP.  In the case of the Northern Province, the poverty gap amounts to  21% of the Gross Provincial
Product.
How has poverty changed since 1993? A 1998 resurvey in KwaZulu Natal of the households included in
the SALDRU sample indicates that, in the immediate post-apartheid period, both the depth and the level
of poverty increased. This was accompanied by a widening of the income distribution (Carter and May,
1999). While  a  few  households  close  to  the  poverty  line,  endowed  with  relatively  high  levels  of
productive assets, were able to take advantage of the more favorable policy environment and move ahead,
a much greater number of households -especially  those with  low asset endowments- fell behind. This
suggests that strategies to increase households' access to productive assets will be a key element of any
strategy aimed at sustainable poverty reduction.
3  The land reform program in the context of the RDP strategy
To understand the character of the land reform program, its objectives, and the way in which these were
to  be  implemented,  we  discuss  this  program within the  overall  context  of  the  Reconstruction  and
Development Program  (RDP) launched by  the ANC government  in  1994. Looking  at the  key  RDP
programs jointly  allows not only to appreciate the amount of resources involved but also  to highlight
potential linkages between them.
In 1994, the first  democratically elected government of South Africa committed itself to the  RDP as
policy  framework  to  promote  a  fundamental  transformation  of  the  social,  economic  and  moral
foundations of South African society (ANC, 1994; GNU,  1994). Even though a number of institutional
and substantive changes were introduced 6 in the context of the adoption of the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution strategy (GEAR), poverty reduction and asset redistribution continued to remain at the
5Comparing  different data sets and poverty measures, Leibbrandt and Woolard (1999) have confirmed that  this ranking of
provinces is robust.
One important change was that implementation of the RDP shifted from a specialized program office to become a function of
tine departments. This implied that, instead of a coordinated policy framework that would link the program's  different elements
together in an attempt to exploit their synergies (as was attempted with the original RDP White Paper), implementation was
increasingly guided by sector-specific White Papers, policy documents and legislation. This also implied that monitoring of the
different elements became compartmentalized in individual line ministries, focusing more on the achievement of physical targets
rather than the degree to which their coordinated activity contributed to achieving overall policy goals.
7heart  of the  government's  strategy. The Poverty and Inequality Report  prepared for  the then  Deputy
President  Thabo Mbeki singles out three  programs, land reform, social  welfare and housing  grants, as
standing out as important targeted transfers to the poor (PIR, 1998). Table 2 shows budgeted expenditures
(in nominal terms) on each of these programs for the period 1995 to 2002.
The table shows that land reform is the third largest element of South Africa's  RDP policies. Resources
spent are more  modest  than  in the pension  and housing  program,  amounting to  less than  5% of the
pension and about 12% of the resources available to the housing program. Studies had shown that demand
for residential  as well as productive land is considerable (Marcus et al.  1996). Ownership of productive
land not only helps to improve nutrition and smooth consumption, to gain access to credit, and to make
productive investments. The program's  three main elements, tenure reform, restitution, and redistribution
are complementary  parts of a comprehensive approach to deal with the legacy of apartheid and  at the
same time establish the basis for development of a diverse rural sector in South Africa. The number of
potential beneficiaries to be reached by these three components jointly  could well exceed the number of
those benefiting from housing and pension programs.
Tenure reform  is based  on  the recognition  that  a  diversified  rural  economy that  provides  economic
opportunities and well-functioning factor markets requires secure property rights for all  South Africans.
Given  the  apartheid  regime's  attempts to  systematically  undermine  land tenure  security, the  pent  up
demand  for  such  a  program  is  tremendous.  According  to  official  estimates,  the  program's  target
population  amounts to  almost 6 million  rural households, comprised of three main  groups, namely (i)
some 3.9 million  black  rural  households in former bantustans and  South African Development  Trust
(SADT) areas; (ii) roughly 800,000 permanent farm-worker households whose lodging is only as secure
as their jobs and who are most affected by the labor-shedding on large farms associated with agricultural
liberalization; (iii)  about 1.3 million  households living in informal and  squatter housing in and around
urban areas. Some of the complex issues involved in tenure reform are illustrated in Cousins (1995) and
in Adams et al. (2000). The government aims to meet about 10%-1  5% of these demands of people with
insecure tenure, or 600,000 to 900,000 households, over the next 5-10 years.
Restitution  aims to provide specific compensation to victims of forced "black spot removals"  that have
been undertaken since 1913. Cases, which had to be lodged before the end of 1998, are dealt with through
the Land Claims Court and Commission. Given the complex nature of the cases involved, the legislation
aimed  to  establish  a  quick  administrative  rather  than judicial  process  to  settle claims.  This was  not
completely  successful - of  the  more  than  40,000  cases  submitted,  less than  1%  has  been  resolved
successfully.  Furthermore,  the  need  for  written  documentation  of  land  ownership  implies  that  the
8restitution program is heavily biased in favor of urban areas which account for more than  90% of the
cases lodged.
A program of redistributive land reform was established with the aim of providing opportunities for the
large  number  of black  households  who  wanted  to  gain  access to  land  but  did  not  have  specific
documentation to  enter  the restitution  program nor were eligible  to benefit  from  tenure reform.  The
general principle of the program is to provide a grant, equal to the maximum subsidy under the National
housing program (R  16,000 or about US $ 2,500) that would allow poor households to acquire land plus
associated productive infrastructure in the regular market. While this was not expected to be sufficient to
establish an independent agricultural operation, it was designed to provide the start-up funds for such an
enterprise, to be complemented from other sources. Recognizing the limitations on the first two programs,
the Government  set very  ambitious targets for land redistribution - aiming to  transfer  30% of  South
Africa's 99.07 million hectare farmland, or 29.72 million hectares, between 1994 and  1999. After three
years of operation, about 200,000  hectares of land have been transferred to about 20,000 households,
representing 0.6% of the target, and 0.2% of the households demanding land.
The second, and quantitatively most important, element of the RDP is the old age pension program. This
is an enormous program under which the Department of Welfare pays social grants on a monthly basis to
1.6 million beneficiaries.  The payments made under the pension scheme are relatively large, accounting
for 22% of rural incomes and 28% of income for the poorest groups. As illustrated in Table 2, the annual
cost of this program in 1997/98 (with an exchange rate of about 4 R per US $) amounted to more than US
$  1.5 billion. Evaluations,  most of them  based on the  1993 SALDRU data, suggest  that the program
provided a significant source of income, on a reliable and non-discriminatory (e.g. gender) basis to remote
areas, reaching predominantly the poor and therefore being an effective tool for redistribution (Case and
Deaton  1996). Two-thirds of pensions go to rural areas. Given that sixty percent of African households
with pensioners are three generation households with children present, pensions may have considerable
spillover  effects  and  the  pension  system  could  be  seen  as an  effective  tool  to  provide  income  to
households where poor children live. Roughly a third of all children below age of four are in households
receiving pensions, and the percentage of children living with pensioners is higher in the poorer quintiles
(Stats SA, 1997). It has been shown that pensions that accrue to women (but not to men) significantly
reduce stunting of children in the recipient households (Duflo 1999).
The third  program  is the  national housing  subsidy scheme, administered through  Provincial Housing
Boards,  which  provides  a  once-off  capital  subsidy  for  land,  housing  and  infrastructure  to  those
beneficiaries earning less than R3,500 per month. The subsidy scheme represents a compromise between
popular demands for the state to deliver complete houses for all and a concern to spread housing benefits
9widely. The maximum lump sum subsidy, available for the very poor, is R16,000. As, in most cases, this
is insufficient to cover the costs of a serviced site and a 40 square meter top structure, households have to
augment the  subsidy with a loan (or from own savings) or embark  on an incremental  housing process
where only a rudimentary shelter can be provided at outset. Between April 1994 and September 1999, the
Department of Housing facilitated the construction of some 920,000 housing units, thus spending some
70%  of the  allocated  budget.  This  notwithstanding,  the  services  provided have,  in many  cases,  not
corresponded to beneficiary demand and failed to crowd in the private sector or transform beneficiaries
into worthy subjects for the credit market (Tomlinson 1999).
4  Evidence on land reform implementation
In this section we use the survey evidence to examine whether land reform was targeted to the poor; to
what degree the data can provide evidence on a potential conflict between attaining equity and efficiency
goals; and whether characteristics of successful projects might be used to inform the overall design of the
land reform program.  We start  out with  descriptive evidence and  then move to  econometric analysis.
Main results are  that  (i) the  program was well  generally  targeted; (ii)  establishment  of economically
viable  projects did, according to the available evidence, not conflict with the objective of reaching  the
poor; and (iii) successful projects were characterized by beneficiaries making an own contribution, often
taking out credit from other sources, and adopting a more streamlined management and decision-making
structure than those that were initially envisaged by the program administration.
4.1  Household characteristics and targeting
The data used are from a survey of 1168 randomly selected beneficiaries in 87 land reform projects that
was conducted in September and October of 1999 as part of the first phase of an on-going monitoring and
evaluation  exercise  by  DLA.  The sample was drawn  in two-stages.  A  first  stage  selected  individual
projects with  probability proportional to size.  In a  second stage  individual households were randomly
selected from a complete beneficiary list drawn up for each of the projects that had been selected in stage
one. This resulted in a final sample of 1168 randomly selected beneficiaries plus the associated projects.
Descriptive  statistics  on  beneficiaries  are  summarized  in  table  3.  One  notes  that  75%  of  program
beneficiaries  fell  below  the  poverty  line. 7 While  there  was  a  considerable  spread  in  beneficiary
households'  level of expenditure, median per capita consumption was less than two thirds of the poverty
line and, by that criterion, the most well-off beneficiaries were found in the Western Cape, followed by
7As  there is no official poverty line in South Africa, we use the 1993 household subsistence line calculated by the Institute for
Planning Research at the University of Port Elizabeth. The figure has been adjusted using an adult equivalence scale, and made
comparable to 1999 figures from the survey using the South African Consumer Price Index provided by Statistics South Africa.
10the Northern  Cape and Gauteng. By comparison, median levels of consumption  by reform beneficiaries
were lowest in the North West, the North, and in KwaZulu Natal. Food accounted for a large share (about
50%) of  land reform  beneficiaries'  budget, suggesting considerable  scope  for  improving  nutrition  by
relying more on home production from the plot received under the program (not reported).
We also note that land reform households comprised on average of 5.5 members and that the head of the
mean  household  was about  50  years old  and  had  about  3 years  of  education  completed.  Levels  of
participation by female headed households in the land reform program are high, contrary to concerns that
the land reform program may be biased against women. In the aggregate, 31% of land reform households
were  female headed and in some provinces, such as Gauteng and Northern Province,  50% or more of
beneficiary  households are headed by females. One also notes that households who  participated  in the
land reform program are endowed with significant levels of un- or underutilized labor - the mean number
of unemployed adults in reform beneficiary households is 1  .1. In more than 20%, the household head is
unemployed. This could suggest that there is significant potential for improving household nutrition and
welfare from own production.
Indicators of infrastructure access support the hypothesis that  land reform targeted poor individuals  in
remote areas and with bad housing. More than 70% of beneficiaries were located in areas with bad roads,
and almost half with roads that were permanently or regularly impassable. 55% lacked running water and
two thirds had either no toilet or a pit latrine. With such relatively low levels of infrastructure access, it is
surprising  to  find that  a  significant share had access to electricity.  Note, however, that  there  is  large
regional variation in this variable -which ranges from more than 80% in the Free State to less than 5% in
the Northwest.
Another interesting finding from the descriptive statistics is that a large percentage of beneficiaries (50%)
have access to savings and about 25% have access to credit. This might indicate that the program selects
households  with  a  more  entrepreneurial attitude  and that  options to  link the  land  reform  grant  more
closely  to  formal  savings  and  longer-term  credit  might  be  worth  pursuing.  The  hypothesis  that  the
program results in the self-selection of more entrepreneurial households is supported by the higher levels
of  ownership  of  farm  animals  among  land  reform  beneficiaries,  even  if compared  only to  the  rural
population. Almost 60% of land reform beneficiaries own poultry, 44% own goats, 37% own pigs, and
27% own  cattle, with  inter-provincial  differences in  line with  agro-climatic  conditions  (not  reported).
IIAlso, of the land reform  beneficiaries, 32% had  access to pensions, and  6% reported to have  earlier
accessed the housing grant. 8
To put the characteristics of land reform beneficiaries in perspective, it would be desirable to compare
them  to those of the country as a whole. For the variables that  are available  in both  surveys, such a
comparison can be undertaken using the SALDRU survey. In doing so one has to bear in mind that, with
limitations in variable coverage? and an absence of reliable recall data, the ability to make  systematic
inferences on beneficiaries pre-project status is limited essentially to infrastructure access. Nonetheless,
probit  regression  for  land  reform  participation performed  on  the  combined  sample  of  land  reform
beneficiaries and the rural non-white part of the 1993 SALDRU survey'  suggest that, even within this
group, the program was well targeted. The fact that land reform beneficiaries had systematically worse
infrastructure access than non-beneficiaries within the target group clearly allows to reject the hypothesis
that program benefits are appropriated by non-poor or non-eligible beneficiaries.
Detailed results are presented in table 4. As illustrated in equation (1), land reform beneficiaries' access to
social infrastructure is significantly below that of even the remainder of the rural non-white population.
Limited access to water and bad roads stand out. Similarly, they are far more distant from good roads than
the population average and much more likely to have no toilet. In addition, they  have more people in
higher age and a lower dependency ratio, with the number of persons aged between  14 and 60 being
marginally significant. While the head's  age is highly significant, education is not. The high significance
of provincial dummies points towards large  differences across provinces in the extent  of land  reform
implementation.  Adding household assets (in equation 2) indicates that, as noted earlier,  land reform
beneficiaries are more likely to have access to farm animals (cattle and poultry) as well as electricity, as
noted from the descriptive analysis.
All of this suggests that, contrary to land reform programs in other countries such as Brazil which seem to
reach the relatively better off within the poor (Buinainain et al.  1999), mis-targeting is not an issue in
South Africa. This leads to the issue of land reform projects' economic viability and the characteristics of
economically successful ventures.
s The  data  do not allow  to determine  whether  this actually  reflected  that beneficiaries  had accessed  the grant  twice or, as is more
likely, they had confused the land purchase grant with the housing grant and interviewers were not sufficiently alert to  seek
further  clarification  on this.
9 For example,  the SALDRU  survey does not contain information  on whether or not the household  benefited from other
govemment  programs.
10  As both the white rural or the non-with  urban population  are far better off than non-white  people,  their inclusion  obviously
would  greatly strengthen the  results reported here.  In view of  the fact that the target  group is restricted to  the non-white
population,  we  refrain  from doing  so, noting  that  the above  results  imply  that  the program  is  well-targeted  to the poor even  within
this group.
124.2  Characteristics  of successful  projects
To make inferences about the projects implemented under the program, we compute gross annual revenue
from agricultural production, i.e. incomes minus expenditures on variable inputs, obtained by beneficiary
groups at the project level. This provides an indication of the returns to fixed factors of production (land,
labor, and management)  from the land reform project. As  illustrated in the bottom part of table 3, the
mean annual revenue per beneficiary amounts to R 6,212 with considerable variance. In KwaZulu Natal,
the Northwest, and the Northern Cape, revenues are virtually zero. By contrast, mean revenue is high in
Northern Province and the Western Cape.
Indeed, our data point to clear differences in the way the program was implemented, suggesting that more
detailed  study  of the  models  adopted  in  successful provinces  could  lead to  interesting  insights.  One
variable of interest in this context is the number of household included in the land reform project. The
project size, which is about 25 at the national average, varies between 8 households in the Western Cape
and the Free State, and 81 and 95 in Northern Province and the Eastern Cape, respectively. Furthermore,
land received  under  the land  reform  program  is supposed to  be operated  collectively  in  71%  of the
projects, a variable that shows even larger inter-provincial variation. The percentage of collective projects
ranges from almost  100% in the Free  State and Mpumalanga  to about one third  in the Northern  and
Western Cape  and  in KwaZulu Natal.  However, to  interpret this  figure,  one  has to  note  that,  of the
projects that were officially approved and therefore included in the survey, only about half reported to
actually  have been able to take possession of the land. The share of projects where land was actually
transferred to  beneficiaries ranges between  less than 20% in the Eastern Cape and  almost 80% in the
Northwest  of the country,  pointing to  considerable differences  in  which the  program  operates  across
regions.
The variation in implementation is matched by differences in other project characteristics and the socio-
economic  environment  into  which  the  projects  are  being  implemented.  To  obtain  access  to  the
government grant, beneficiaries have to form a legal entity with its own internal by-laws and regulations.
Survey evidence  indicating  that  less than  two thirds (64.4%)  of the  community  leaders  in approved
projects were aware of the contents of these regulations. This implies that in more than a third of projects
there  is a basic lack of awareness of the broader goals of their project, let  alone a  clear definition  of
decision-making structures to help in day-to day management. Greater emphasis  on capacity building to
improve  beneficiaries'  awareness  of  the  program  and  its  rules,  and  clarification  that  collective
management is not required, appear to be called for. Given the large variation across provinces -virtually
all of the community leaders know the constitution  in the Free State but less than 40% inMpumalanga-
much might be gained by improved sharing experience across provinces.
13One of the options available to  beneficiaries as a  group is to require individual households to  make
regular cash  contributions which towards the  provision of public  goods such as marketing, training,
purchase of machinery, etc. The data show that such contributions are being made in slightly more than
one third of the projects. The three provinces where the share of beneficiaries making a contribution is
lowest (KwaZulu Natal, Northern Cape, and Northwest with 11%, 11%, and 22%, respectively) are also
those where virtually none of the projects was economically viable. Even though this does, of course, not
imply any causality, pursuing the possibility of a link between these two variables might be of interest. In
addition  to  the  factors  discussed  above,  we  find  that  land  reform  projects  are  implemented  in
environments  where  theft,  land  invasions, and  violence are widespread (with 61%,  36%,  and  28%,
respectively).
In view  of the  high  variability  of project  outcomes,  and  to  derive  policy  conclusions, we  explore
commonalties between economically successful projects. Doing so is of interest for two main reasons. On
the one hand, it allows us to address the concern that viable projects might have excluded the poor and/or
are successful only because they were able to "pick" the most able (educated, wealthy, entrepreneurial)
beneficiaries. If true, this would raise doubts about the scope of land reform in South Africa to reconcile
equity and efficiency objectives and to serve as a broadly replicable tool for poverty reduction. On the
other hand, finding indicators, either at the project or at the beneficiary level, which seem to be strongly
correlated  with good performance could be of considerable interest for  program design. Using these
systematically could help  in streamlining the program and defining eligibility criteria for approval of
individual projects.
As a first step, we group the land reform projects included in the survey by the amount of total revenue
per beneficiary household into two groups, one with no or negligible and one with sustainable revenues]1
Using this criterion, 14 projects (or about 16% of the total) are classified as having "sustainable revenues"
with the rest falling into the other category. As table 5 illustrates, projects in the former category generate
a median annual revenue of R 10,000 per beneficiary, sufficient to lift beneficiaries out of poverty. On the
other  hand,  even  accounting for  the  fact that  most  of  the  projects  are  still  in  the  early  stages  of
implementation and that revenues might reasonably expected to increase over time, the large number of
non-viable projects points towards the scope (and need) for considerable improvement. Ability to  show
that  successful projects  benefited the poor would thus be doubly valuable,  not only to  indicate that,
despite the  slow  start,  the  program has  potential to  benefit  the  poor but  also  (and  probably  more
11  The purpose of this exercise is not to establish causality but rather to make the point that use of certain criteria to select
beneficiaries is likely to be associated with better project quality without compromising the program's poverty goals.
14importantly) that, even though not all are economically viable, the overall orientation is at least on the
right track.
Table  5, which presents the results of this  comparison, allows us to clearly reject the hypothesis that
projects in the "high" revenue category were doing well because they were captured by a narrow minority
of well-educated, wealthy, and experienced beneficiaries. To the contrary, land reform projects in this
group included a larger number of poor (81.4% as compared to 73.7%) than the low revenue category.
Moreover, beneficiaries had  significantly lower  per capita spending (R  260 as compared to  R 346),
housing quality (85% as compared to 63% had no toilet or a  pit latrine), and asset ownership (9% as
compared to  21% had a  telephone) in the former as compared to the  latter. Participants  in the  high
revenue group were also significantly less likely to have simultaneously accessed the housing subsidy
(1.6% as compared to  7%) and  had  significantly lower  endowments of education (average  years of
education by the household head was 2.81 as compared to 3.15 years). Finally, in the high revenue group,
a  higher percentage  (35%  as compared to  30%) was female  headed,  although the  difference  is not
statistically significant. All available indications seem, thus, to suggest that there was no conflict between
targeting land  reform to  the poor and aiming to  establish projects that  provided a  minimum  level of
economic viability.'2 Given that projects established by beneficiaries with lower endowments were also
more successful economically, there  may be considerable potential for improving the poverty-reducing
impact of land reform by focusing on both of these aspects jointly.
To make this useful for program design, we aim to explore in more detail characteristics associated with
better  performance  at  the  project  level.  Three  attributes  in  this  category  stand  out,  namely  (i)
beneficiaries' willingness to make a cash contribution towards the project; (ii) the size and management
of the  project  as  indicated  by  the  number  of participating  households and  the  type  of  community
organization;  and  (iii)  private sector involvement in project  monitoring as indicated  by the  fact that
projects received a loan from a third party.
The data show that projects whose beneficiaries make a  regular cash  contribution are more likely to
belong to the top group and have significantly higher revenues than those where this is not the case. This
is of particular interest in view of the earlier result that having  an own  contribution by  beneficiaries
(which can be modest) does not discriminate against the poor. It is also in line with experience from other
countries where the willingness to spend time and money on activities associated with project preparation
has emerged as an important criterion to signal beneficiary interest. In terms of program design, this
12 This is in line with findings from Zimbabwe  where, over a much longer time horizon, beneficiaries' initial
endowment  with assets  and human capital  were found  to be unrelated  to their productive  success  (Gunning  et al.
1  999).
15would suggest that replacing the  100% grant element with a combination of grant and own contribution
would  enhance  not  only  beneficiaries'  sense  of  "ownership"  but  also  the  probability  of  a  projects'
economic success.
A second point of interest is that successful and unsuccessful projects also show clear differences in size
and management structure. "Low revenue" projects comprise almost 30 households on average, compared
to an average of less than 10 households for successful ones. In addition, 90% of unsuccessful projects are
run by a trust or a common property association, a legal figure developed specifically for the land reform
program, whereas a significant share of successful projects is based on different arrangements. This is in
line with the notion that limitations currently imposed by the need to form rigid legal entities, the purpose
of which is often neither understood by beneficiaries nor by many of DLA's  staff, may be detrimental to
projects'  economic  success. It may  be prudent to allow beneficiaries to  adopt management  structures
more suited to their specific needs. This should include an option for individualization of production and
adopt joint arrangements only for marketing and other aspects where there are clear economies of scale.
The case of "share equity schemes", a type of projects that has emerged a response to the high prices of
land (including standing crops and the processing  and marketing infrastructure)  in labor-intensive high
value crops such as wine, fruit trees, and other perennials, illustrates this point. In these crops, the land
acquisition grant is not sufficient to give poor people access to a plot of land that can provide a basis for
their sustenance. To overcome this, beneficiaries -in  many cases former farm workers- have formed joint
ventures (often involving leasing arrangements rather than straight purchase of land) with the landlord, an
outside manager, and/or a third party investor (Eckert et al 1996).
Clearly, not  all of these  ventures are a  success and capacity  building and  legal advice  are needed to
protect beneficiaries from being abused by bankrupt white farmers whose only interest is to obtain public
resources to clean up their balance sheets. Nonetheless, they illustrate the scope for inventive adaptation
by local communities and suggest that innovative forms of land access, which might involve leases with
the  option  to buy,  phased  land  acquisition,  or the  establishment of joint  ventures,  could  have  much
potential and will be likely to form part of the emerging land reform picture in South Africa.
Other innovations in the same spirit that have emerged include the establishment of a link between the
land reform grant and prior saving, credit schemes that are adapted to the cash flow to be generated by the
project, and other NGO- and private  sector-led initiatives (Lyne et al.  1998). All of this  suggests that
greater popular participation  could pave the way for a  significant increase in the pace of land reform
delivery and at the same time reduce the program's current dependence on the capacity and constraints of
the government bureaucracy.
16The case for increasing the flexibility of the program is also supported by evidence from KwaZulu Natal
where recent research shows that land transactions outside the government program have, between 1996
and  1998, transferred  more  land  from  formerly  advantaged to  disadvantaged  households  than  did
government schemes (Graham and Lyne 1999)." This illustrates the economic potential of land reform -
the private land purchasers are able to use the returns generated to pay off a loan and sustain their family-
as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  land  reform  program  in  its  present  form  may  be  less  responsive  to
beneficiaries' needs and desires than would be hoped.
Finally, "high revenue" projects are found to also be significantly more likely to have obtained a group
loan to complement public grant resources. This suggests that many land reform beneficiaries are able to
combine the land reform grant with other sources of credit. 14 It may illustrate the scope for private sector
lenders to complement -and eventually substitute for- costly and bureaucratic efforts to "pick winners"
and assess projects'  viability ex ante that are currently carried out by government. Receipt of a loan is
likely to indicate examination and continued outside monitoring of the project by the private sector and
might,  at  least  in  the  long term,  offer  to  replace  present  procedures,  which  are  often  ad-hoc  and
bureaucratic, with more transparent, predictable, and quick approval processes.
5  Conclusion and policy implications
In contrast to  most  past discussions of redistributive land reform,  this paper  has provided empirical
evidence on  actual  implementation. Although  many  of the  projects  are  still  in the  early  stages  of
implementation, the data suggest that land reform was able to target the poor. Moreover, the fact that
economically  successful  projects  reached  significantly  higher  levels  of  poor  people  suggests  that
increased access to  productive assets could be an important avenue for poverty  reduction. Given  the
imnportance  of developing  a  diverse and  less subsidy-dependent rural  sector, a  suitably adapted  land
reform could play an important role in the restructuring of South Africa's rural sector.
At the same time. the limited progress under the current program suggests that much of this potential is,
as of yet,  Linrealized.  Our analysis points towards a number of clear lessons with respect to  program
design, as discussed earlier. Probably the most important conclusion is to increase beneficiary awareness
and participation. Doing so would include shifting from a bureaucratic and centralized approval structure
specifically designed for land distribution towards a more integrated vision that takes account of other
'3  It would be very interesting to use the sample of private land transactions for case studies to illustrate specific factors that could
act as barriers to entry into the land market - and ways in which institutions and capacity building efforts may be aligned to
reduce their impact.
14  Even though some of these credits may have been designed to complement government programs, the private sector takes
some risk and therefore performs an important monitoring function in all of them.
17program components and puts them into the context of broader rural development goals. This would not
only strengthen links to the broader land reform program (in particular tenure reform) and to better utilize
synergies at  the local level (i.e. including complementary infrastructure such as housing, material  for
minor  infrastructure works, etc.)  and  encourage, rather than  stifle,  local initiative  and  decentralized
implementation mechanisms.
Although these results are based on evidence from the specific context of South Africa, they hold lessons
for other countries where discussion of redistributive land reform is currently on the policy agenda, in
Africa and beyond. In Zimbabwe, discussions on land redistribution have generated attention and concern
among donors and investors alike. Integration of land redistribution into a land policy framework that
guarantees existing property rights and aims to increase tenure security for residents of communal areas
has  emerged  as an  issue  of  critical  importance. At  the  same time  it is  realized  that  private  sector
participation, transparency, and accountability at the local level will be critical to  dispel fears that land
reform is just another means of political favoritism, rather than an instrument to transform the rural sector
(Govemment of Zimbabwe, 1998). In Brazil "negotiated" land redistribution that is based on beneficiary
initiative and active involvement of the private sector has advanced very rapidly. In addition to having
private financial  intermediaries carry a real credit risk, greater involvement of civil society at  large to
ensure that the program is not driven by landlords, as well as a stronger focus on capacity building at the
community  level, seem  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  program will  be  sustainable  in  the  long  term
(Bunainain et al  1999). Finally, in the Philippines, where adoption of a "community-based" approach to
land reform is currently debated, past land reform attempts have, by undermining the functioning of the
land  rental  market,  precluded  access to  land  by  many  poor  and  landless  households. Linking  the
elimination of these barriers to greater local participation, and in particular effective collection of land
taxes is likely to provide far greater benefits to the poor than what has been possible through a program of
purely redistributive land reform (Deininger et al. 1999).
All of the above evidence suggests that there is plenty of scope for an increased role for beneficiaries,
local government units, communities, and the private sector to improve implementation of the land reform
program. While the experience thus far has been important to demonstrate the potential of redistributive
land reform to improve equity as well as efficiency, scaling up of the program - and its integration into
the  broader context  of land  reform in  South Africa will require that government perform more of a
facilitating role. The challenge is to move towards a land reform process that puts the program into a
broader  context,  and  aim  to  empower  the  poor,  improve productivity,  and  create  sustainable  rural
livelihoods, rather  than  just  redistribute hectares  of  land.  South Africa certainly  offers  considerable
potential for implementation of land redistribution within the broader land reform program. Being aware
18of the  obstacles  to  making  this  effective  is probably the  best  way to  ensure  that  land  reform  will
contribute to advancing both equity and efficiency.
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22Table  la:  Poverty,  Inequality  and Unemployment  in South  Africa  1995
Indicator  Share  Pct  Number  of people
Poverty  Rate  Total  49.9  19 700,000
Poverty  rate  in non-urban  areas  70.9  13 700,000
Poverty  rate  in urban  areas  28.5  6,000,000
Poverty  share  of non-urban  areas  71.6
African  poverty  rate  60.7  18  300,000
White poverty  rate  1  44,000
Unemployment  Rate  29.3  4 250,000
Income  share  of poorest  40% of households  11
National  Gini  coefficient  0.52
Table  lb: Provincial  Distribution  of Poverty  1995
Province  Population  % Hhds  living  in  % Ind. Living  in  Poverty  gap  Poverty  Gap as a  % of Population
poverty  poverty  R million  % of GGP  Non-Urban
Eastern  Cape  6,302,526  40.4  50.0  3303  11.4  63.4
Free  State  6,633,504  56.8  64.0  3716  15.7  31.4
Gauteng  7,348,423  29.7  41.0  917  0.6  3.0
KwaZulu-Natal  8,417,021  36.1  47.1  1159  2.0  56.9
Mpumulanga  2,800,712  33.8  45.1  968  3.1  60.9
North  West  3,354,825  15.4  21.1  1551  7.3  65.1
Northern  Cape  840,321  38.2  48.0  257  3.2  29.9
Northern  Province  4,929,368  61.9  69.3  2948  21.4  89.0
Western  Cape  3,956,874  14.1  17.9  529  1.0  11.1
South  Africa  40,583,574  35.2  45.7  15348  4.0  46.3
Table  2: Expenditures  on the  three  key  RDP Programs  R  Million
Year  Pensions  Housing  Land  Reform
95/96  5,417  821  25
96/97  6,049  1,453  104
97/98  6,717  2,635  197
98/99  7,382  3,019  407
99/00  6,247  2,971  388
00/01  6,564  2,905  499
01/02  6,833  3,417  517
Total  45,209  17,222  2,137
Source:  Derived  from National  Expenditure  Survey  and  MTEFTable 3: Profile  of land  reform  projects  and beneficiaries
National  Eastern  Free State  Gauteng  KwaZulu  Mpumalanga  Northem  Northern  Northwest  Western
Cape  Natal  Cape  Province  Cape
Household  level information
Poor  74.9%  77.9%  73.4%  74.6%  79.7%  83.1%  66.7%  71.8%  83.3%  66.8
Percapita  expenditure  median  221.08  209.19  237.51  248.28  177.91  191.14  263.50  180.39  120.73  310.66
No.  of household  members  5.47  4.68  4.64  4.14  7.61  6.35  4.54  5.97  5.03  4.81
Head's  age  years  50.45  48.41  51.41  44.96  52.14  52.47  51.07  54.37  50.67  45.53
Head's  education  years  3.09  3.58  3.38  4.69  1.87  2.75  3.65  2.73  2.45  3.48
Female  headed  30.8%  28.4%  21.2%  50.0%  25.9%  28.8%  35.4%  56.5%  30.2%  20.0%
Access  to housing  subsidy  6.2%  2.7%  3.9%  6.8%  4.8%  2.1%  11.6%  0.0%  0.0%  21.3%
Receive  pension  32.4%  22.3%  23.9%  14.0%  38.8%  35.4%  32.0%  53.5%  42.9%  23.5%
Have  savings  account  50.1%  44.2%  55.3%  47.5%  48.3%  38.7%  51.4%  37.0%  41.3%  82.6%
Access  to credit  24.1%  37.5%  35.3%  10.3%  24.3%  12.0%  20.5%  10.2%  27.0%  35.5%
Accesstoelectricity  42.2%  35.4%  82.5%  42.4%  10.8%  42.1%  38.8%  24.1%  4.5%  71.8%
No  running  water  54.9%  69.9%  21.4%  52.5%  85.8%  67.2%  51.0%  73.6%  87.9%  2.8%
Roads  bad  72.5%  59.3%  53.9%  83.1%  94.6%  80.5%  65.3%  86.4%  74.2%  66.9%
Roads  impassable  most  of the  time  44.6%  46.0%  28.6%  23.7%  49.3%  50.3%  93.2%  50.9%  13.6%  16.2%
Pit latrine  or no toilet  66.2%  92.0%  57.1%  45.8%  86.5%  90.8%  56.5%  95.5%  28.8%  16.9%
No permanent  housing  54.1%  51.3%  48.7%  74.6%  82.4%  57.9%  45.6%  42.7%  74.2%  26.8%
Noofindividuals  1160  113  154  59  148  195  147  110  66  142
Project  level information
Mean  revenue  per beneficiary  6212.7  1630.0  2222.5  1484.5  -3.3  5355.6  181.8  18043.3  5.4  15432.7
Number  of people  on the legal  entity  24.5  94.9  7.8  12.0  10.3  12.0  10.6  80.8  13.5  7.6
Share  of  land communally  operated  71.3%  72.8%  97.8%  45.7%  37.1%  95.9%  34.4%  64.8%  86.3%  37.6%
Share  of projects  who  received  land  50.5%  19.5%  60.4%  40.7%  34.5%  73.8%  39.5%  67.3%  77.3%  39.4%
Know  community  constituiton  64.4%  44.2%  98.1%  45.8%  58.1%  39.5%  84.4%  71.8%  74.2%  62.7%
Make  contribution  to project  35.4%  48.7%  77.3%  44.1%  10.8%  26.7%  10.9%  50.0%  22.7%  34.5%
Committee  works  harmoniously  71.3%  87.5%  46.7%  60.0%  84.6%  76.9%  63.6%  100.0%  50.0%  66.7%
Violence  is a problem  27.6%  12.5%  20.0%  60.0%  61.5%  15.4%  36.4%  11.1%  50.0%  22.2%
Land  invasions  are  a problem  35.6%  25.0%  26.7%  40.0%  84.6%  46.2%  27.3%  11.1%  50.0%  22.2%
Theft  is  a problem  60.9%  37.5%  66.7%  40.0%  100.0%  69.2%  54.5%  66.7%  100.0%  55.5%
No  of projects  87  8  15  5  13  13  11  9  4  9
Source: DLA Land Reform Beneficiary SurveyTable 4: Probit regressions for land reformn  participation
Mean of  variables  Regressions
(1)  (2)
Number of rooms  3.90  -0.003  -0.005*
(1.47)  (2.06)
No access to running water  9.0%  0.647**  0.662**
(21.89)  (21.17)
No toilet  62.2%  0.034*  0.055**
(2.06)  (3.26)
Roads passable most of the time  33.0%  -0.052**  -0.056**
(3.33)  (3.63)
Roads passable all of the time  40.0%  -0.291**  -0.282**
(14.94)  (14.52)
Head's education  2.96  0.003  0.001
(1.16)  (0.33)
Head's age  50.29  0.008*  0.007*
(2.24)  (2.30)
Head's age squared  2783.10  0,000+*  0.000**
(2.82)  (2.91)
Female head  32.7%  0.006  0.035*
(0.40)  (2.22)
Number of persons younger than 14  2.02  -0.028**  -0.026**
(6.74)  (6.21)
No. of persons age 14-60  3.35  0.007+  0.002
(1.72)  (0.52)
No. of persons age more than 60  0.43  0.085**  0.074**
(6.28)  (5.42)
Free State  7.8%  0.443**  0.420**
(12.05)  (10.59)
Gauteng  1.2%  0.815**  0.828**
(11.19)  (10.61)
KwaZulu  19.2%  -0.079**  -0.091**
(3.58)  (3.73)
Mpumalanga  13.8%  0.188**  0.169**
(6.58)  (5.32)
Northern Cape  2.9%  0.813**  0.828**
(14.76)  (14.13)
Northern Province  18.2%  -0.019  -0.003
(0.76)  (0.13)
Northwestern Province  14.8%  -0.028  0.013
(0.96)  (0.40)
Western Cape  3.5%  0.790**  0.788**
(17.73)  (16.07)
Household has electricity  28.9%  0.147**
(7.73)
Household owns cattle  17.5%  0.145**
(6.14)
Household owns sheep or goatt  16.4%  0.005
(0.22)
Houeshold owns poultry  28.3%  0.054**
(2.64)
Household owns pigs  8.5%  0.015
(0.54)
Pseudo R'  0.4645  0.4914
Log-likelihood  -1285.73  -1220.33
No. of observations  4256  4256  4255
Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%
Source: Land reform M&E survey plus SALDRU sample for non-whites in rural areas only.Table 5: Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful projects
Low revenue  High revenue
Community level variables
Number of people on legal entity  27.56  9.14
Revenue per person median  -9.0  10552.1
Community has taken a loan  9.6%  42.9%
Trust or CPA are main decision-makers  90.0%  66.7%
Manager is main decision-maker  3.3%  25.0%
Individual  characteristics
Per capita expenditure mean  346.22  259.93
Per capita expenditure median  228.73  189.90
Share of poor beneficiaries  73.7%  81.4%
No. of household members  5.45  5.57
Head's age  50.21  51.70
Head's education  3.15  2.81
Female headed  30.1%  34.6%
Household accessed housing subsidy  7.0%  1.6%
Household owns cattle  25.9%  32.4%
Household owns car  16.5%  11.9%
Household owns telephone  21.5%  9.1%
Household has access to electricity  42.3%  41.6%
Household has no running water  56.1%  48.9%
Roads are bad  72.1%  74.5%
Roads are impassable most of the time  45.0%  42.6%
Household has pit latrine or no toilet  62.6%  85.1%
Household does not live in a permanent building  53.6%  56.9%
Household makes cash contribution to project  32.0%  53.5%
Source: DLA Land Reform Beneficiary Survey
Note: Bold  coefficients are significantly different at 10% and those in bold italics  at 5% or higher.
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